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DURING the conict there was always a prevailing view – at governmental, policy, legal and mass media levels – of the North as an irresolvable tribal dispute that was mired in an almost mythically repetitive and reiterative 
stasis, impervious to the goodwill of liberal democracy. Hence, mainstream 
political discourse would not only partake in a lexicon of ‘cycles of violence’, 
‘tit-for-tat killings’ or ‘things spiralling out of control’, it could also, once self-
instantiated as the honourable broker or the liberal centre seeking to manage this 
turmoil, deliberate “an acceptable level of violence”. Implicit in this concept of 
an “acceptable level of violence” is that the best the forces of liberal democracy 
may do with such recalcitrant historical stagnancy is to police, quarantine, and 
manage it. ere was always a large body of cultural representation that was not 
only complicit in such political discourses of crisis management but also helped 
to produce and arm them. In popular culture, the thriller often performed 
this function on page and on screen. Christopher Newmann’s e Devil’s Own, 
which also made it onto the big screen, resignedly discloses:  “In Ireland, there 
are no happy endings” 1. So there is a consonance between the understanding of 
Northern Ireland as a fated place, where no substantive change is possible, and 
the thriller form. e latter must suspend nal resolution and seek only to enact 
move and countermove in a chain of endless violence and retribution where the 
local erasure of a few bad guys will never x the bigger picture. e overarching 
frame can only ever be ongoing and vigilant monitoring and policing. 
Here the subject matter and the form of its representation are rendered identical. 
is convergence proposes a very weak or passive provision of Aristotle’s concept 
of mimesis wherein representation is made the mere reection of its referent. It 
thus forgoes a fuller sense of Aristotle’s concept as praxis, of art as an intervention 
that may reshape, contest and reformulate its materials rather than surrender 
itself to the imitation of an already agreed set of actions in a predesigned form.2 
In a sense, if only by default, Margaret Scanlan, by deciding the inaccessibility 
of proper or High Art to the Troubles and thus clearing the ground for popular 
cultural mediations, justies the appropriateness of the correlation of the thriller 
form to Northern Ireland, so that both embrace one another in predetermined 
and interwoven xity:  “the aesthetic impulse is as alien to the Shankill Road as 
the well-shaped plot is to the erratic behaviour of home-made bombs; a private 
life, in the face of repeated violations, becomes almost as inconceivable as a simple 
moral judgment or a happy ending”.3 So the North, wherein history as dynamic, 
as change, as process, is supposedly impossible, requires an arrested form of 
representation; a narrative which abjures its own status as narrative (as movement, 
shaping and action), and instead joins its referent in refractive immobility. is 
paralysed mimesis is found even in parodic takes on the thriller, such as Colin 
Bateman’s Divorcing Jack, that are designedly intended to play with the genre. 
erein Bateman’s hero, Starkey, claims: “you didn’t need a reason to kill people, 
not here”.4 is sentiment epitomizes rather than subverts the dominant portrait 
of the North as an unintelligible terrain voided of human agency or historical 
intervention, which it is the task of the crime narrative merely to superintend 
and regulate. Although Bateman’s novel must leave a space for its own satire 
and disdain, these are bound to, and must rely upon, the self-same governing 
narrative of the North as entrenched atavism. It thus repeats that narrative and 
oers not an alternative but a sardonic glance thereupon (so that it is nothing 
more disruptive than North Down snootiness). 
So even though, on the one hand, the North was regarded as an irredeemable 
and inexplicable antagonism, it was also, on the other, made consensually 
reducible to the one, readily explicable narrative of violence. Such a terminal 
exegesis – a regime of representation whose forms and outcomes are resigned to 
already knowing what they feign to seek and uncover – even sears itself on more 
serious literary treatments such as John Hewitt’s Regionialism programme. is 
project sought to reconceive the North as a regional space (rather than a failed or 
contested state) in which Protestant, Dissenter, Catholic and other strands might 
interconnect in shared ways that circumvented any necessary identication 
with the British or Irish states at a national level. But Hewitt’s mining of these 
varying cultural histories, even before the Troubles thoroughly intensied, 
also encountered an ‘exact geology’, which initially may have been intended as 
markers of the endurance of each tradition, but which degraded very readily 
into the unstoppable collisions of unyielding fault lines.5 Hence, art is ultimately 
imprinted by elemental and non-historical forces. Hewitt’s construction of these 
various traditions as excavations of the North’s diversity rather than its static 
homogeneity (an entirely laudable aim) actually supersaturates the terrain of 
dierent strands that he wishes to make the basis of a pluralistic regionalism, so 
that each once more adds up to a total historical inevitability without alternative 
outcomes to its violence. Towards the end of his life and career, he appended 
‘Postscript 1984’ to the earlier poem, ‘Ulster Names’, which had sought to map 
the linguistic entwining of Irish, English and Scots words in place-names, so 
as to construct a mutually lived landscape that was also a template for future 
belonging together. However these very locales, in the postscript, become sites of 
violence and mayhem during the Troubles: “the whole tarnished map is stained 
and torn, never to be read as pastoral again”.6 e very places and place-names, 
which were to be woven together into a shared belonging and future as diverse 
but agreeable signs of a shared history, are transmuted into static, unchanging 
horror. And “never to be read as pastoral again” implies that amidst this stasis, 
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art must forgo its own active forms and modes before the brute reality of the 
Troubles. Pastoral can no longer be pastoral but solely an emptied mode that can 
only list what might have been its raw materials, which were already the signs of 
a narrative of predestined violence and murder. So form must supplicate itself 
as passive mimesis, the mere semblance of the Form of Forms, the intractable 
inexorability that is the Troubles, which may prescribe not only its own self-
perpetuating meaning but also the form of any artistic encounter with it.
Of course it would have been remiss of writers and artists to ignore the Troubles. 
What is in dispute here, however, is not that the Troubles happened or indeed the 
extent of the terrible violence wrought in its name. It is more an issue of the nature 
and meaning of the Troubles (in other words, that it might have a political and 
social content which is subject to change rather than being a mythic repetition of 
primordial passions) and also as to the role and function of art therein as praxis 
(as variously, explanation, intervention, endorsement or resistance). Each of these 
possibilities of art might complicate both a standard response to social turmoil 
in the North (a certain prescription of aesthetics) and a standard account of the 
violence as itself an arrested representation, a stalled unhistorical narrative. For 
even the prevailing version of the con ict had to adjust its terms with the onset 
of the Peace Process, but this shift was primarily undertaken not on the basis 
of ongoing social, historical and cultural drives but, rather, on the demarcation 
between the past agreed as simply the one, all-encompassing traumatic thing 
and the present as equally and self-evidently contained by its own unexplored 
inevitability. For example, in 1994 when presaging the shift in dispensation, 
Francine Cunningham asked: “so now that the cease re has been announced, 
what will happen to all the Northern Ireland writers? Where will they go for their 
material?”.7 Implicit in such a question is the sense that a speci cally sectarian 
and atavistic account of the Troubles was the zero sum of all Northern Irish 
culture and society. Art and society are made homologous in their agreed identity 
and formal tautology. And if the past and its artistic forms could only mean the 
one thing, then, by extension, the present is voided of any meaning other than 
its own self-evidence. Art is required to accept the consensus of what is, as it had 
previously been directed to formalise an agreed version of what was. Culture 
becomes the mirror securing the self-identity of the way of the world in both 
scenarios. But what if the Troubles were irreducible to that sectarian template 
of tribal stasis? What if what was can be reviewed as something which was not 
homogeneous with itself, but instead harboured heterogeneous possibilities and 
antagonisms?  ese heterogeneities would also trouble, as it were, and persist in 
ways that challenge a version of the present as incontrovertibly agreed. And what 
if the Troubles – and the governing sectarian narrative that would name and 
formulate them – were in fact to be cast as partial and situated responses (rather 
than all-exhausting determinants which simply imitate one another’s underlying 
reality) to profound change rather than stasis?  e dominant narrative would 
itself be unmasked as praxis rather than passive and already formed imitation, as 
an e ort to delimit and contain change and heterogeneous possibilities under the 
rubric of the repetition of the same.
 e prevalent, arrested form of representation of the con ict accords with 
Homi K. Bhabha’s account of the insecure vacillation between ‘ xation’ and 
‘reactivation’ in the construction of the stereotype by a dominant gaze.  is 
model addresses how the need to  x representation (so that it always precludes 
any alternative forms of intervention) is always anxiously repeated. And this 
incessant repetition betrays the  xity which such representational forms pursue.8 
Bhabha inverts the conventional wisdom that stereotypes emerge from positions 
of representational certainty (i.e., we can say these things about a particular 
group of people or situation because they are so obviously and common sensibly 
true). Rather, Bhabha discloses, stereotypes are produced out of moments of 
representational insecurity and anxiety (i.e., we do not possess the imaginative 
capacity to understand this otherness and heterogeneity and have to retreat into 
stereotyping as a defence mechanism to protect our own regime of identity). 
Hence, stereotypes tell us a lot more about the people who construct them than 
those who are represented by them.  e anxious e ort to reactivate and repeat 
the logic of the same in  xated forms therefore strives to remainder materials 
which may be redeemed and recovered aesthetically and politically in their very 
heterogeneity to static mimesis. And if Derek Mahon once wrote that “Even now 
there are places where a thought might grow”9, this entreaty can be unearthed 
even in the apparently most fatalistically secure forms of Troubles representation: 
namely, mass media and popular cultural regimes of visibility. For there was always 
a paradoxical sense that the most mediated visualisations of the con ict were 
somehow unmediated; that the regimes of images promulgated by newspapers, 
television and popular culture were transparently at one with their referent as 
factual self-evidence. Hence, poets such as Mahon or Seamus Heaney would often 
adopt an oblique aesthetic, encountering the con ict indirectly via Bashō’s Japan 
or Norse mythology, not only as a worthy attempt to  nd new pathways and 
angles of approach and departure, but also because of an underlying pessimism 
about the capability of art forms to compete with media imagery, coupled with 
doubts about the wisdom of doing so in the  rst place.  e kernel of this regime 
of images is expressed by the  lm version of Tom Clancy’s Patriot Games. As 
Eamonn Hughes discerns, not one scene in that novel is set in Northern Ireland 
even though it uses a ‘static and unresolved’ narrative of the con ict to drive the 
urgent necessity of its own revenge plot.10  e  lm adaptation o ers one very 
brief staging that serves as a visual shorthand for the broader governing narrative 
of the Troubles: the cursory “this is all you need to know” narrative is signed o  by 
 eeting images of Saracens, red brick and barbed wire. It is a visual regime which 
seeks to  nd not only its referent but also the origins of its own representational 
justi cation retroactively in the ubiquitous supersaturation of its mediations. 
However, if this regime of con ict images is understood as a speci c example of 
representational praxis rather than the mere semblance of a prior form, it is much 
more readily critiqued as a dominant ordering of the North rather than a re ection 
of it. And if some cultural representations form part of that dominant ordering, 
then there is a counter-tradition just as strong which, even at the heart of the 
supposedly most resignedly imitative or self-evidently factual regimes of images, 
attests to how artworks may confound logics of identity patrolling referent and 
mediation. Alan Clarke’s  lm Elephant (1989) was produced by BBC Northern 
Ireland’s drama unit and was e ectively banned because its representation was 
supposedly so at one with the con ict and the violence which it screens.11 It 
comprises just over thirty minutes of shooting scenes, each following one another 
with the same blank repetitiveness with which the various killers confront their 
targets.  ere is no voice-over, no context, no plot or leading protagonists, no 
points of identi cation for a viewer to latch onto some discernible or developing 
narrative. However, Elephant brilliantly discharges the disruptive potential of art, 
its capability to intervene rather than merely re ect or endorse.  e  lm’s title, 
invoking ‘the elephant in the room’, the thing which is permitted to be self-
evidently there but whose incongruous obviousness is never to be acknowledged 
let alone evaluated and considered, crystallizes the whole work’s interrogation 
of the standard ‘cycle of violence’ thesis and the latter’s attendant tautology of 
mediation and referent. Elephant transforms the exhausted exegeses of the con ict 
(at political and cultural levels) beyond their own resignation by turning their 
logic against itself. Clarke sought to bring viewers to the imperative: ‘make it 
stop!’ (directed at both the  lm itself and, concomitantly, the con ict). Elephant 
does this by confronting the standard representation with its own vacuity in the 
starkest form possible with the e acement of plot dynamics through its killing 
after killing after killing: the arrested narrative, the explanation that there is no 
explanation, is divested of its own claims to explicability, knowledge and power. 
Clarke’s  lm over-determines the standard explanation of the con ict to the 
degree that it is unveiled as its own opposite, a lack of explanation, a failure to 
explain, to represent, to understand.  us by staging the reductio ad absurdum 
of the fated political management of the con ict and of cultural representations 
of the North as reiteratively stalled, Elephant supersaturates the supersaturated 
so that these become detached from referent that they would name and govern. 
 e  lm demonstrates that the conceptual lack of narrative as praxis was itself 
an intrusive narrative of delimitation.  e notion that the North may only be 
re ected in its stasis as weak mimesis does not adequately represent or understand 
the very thing over which it claims propriety; it is unveiled as a narrative strategy 
designed to disavow other narrative, historical and political engagements with 
that referent which may energize and contest it as more than stasis and  xity. 
Once the avowedly total and consummate narrative of the Troubles is staged 
in precisely its own terms, as total and consummate, it actually and negatively 
discloses its own limits, its aporia, its nullity, so that it becomes representationally 
absolute solely in its failure rather than its sovereignty.
Elephant permits the viewer to withhold the veri cation of its referent by 
denying the self-sanctioning of its mediation. In so doing, the  lm reminds us, 
in Jacques Rancière’s terms, that we can be emancipated spectators rather than 
passive receptacles for already agreed representational forms that merely report 
already agreed historical conditions.  e very passivity of Elephant’s mimesis is the 
measure of the activity it impels in the viewer to contest its representation and 
its referent. As such, it inverts what has become the standard critical model in 
Western consumer cultures since Guy Debord’s Society of the Spectacle in which 
we are all in thrall to the realm of images (and even those who set themselves up 
as critics in this arena, such as Jean Baudrillard, repeat the very power relations 
of assertive knowledge and ignorant reception that they intend to elucidate).12 
So rather than being an anomaly or peculiarity amongst Western cultures, visual 
art re-engaging this Northern Irish context not only presages what has become 
a generalised condition or malaise but also o ers instructive pathways to and 
from this supposed condition. It is not just narrative and visual regimes which 
are contingent, to be evaluated, tied to particular forms and political forces 
and hegemony, but also their referents, their social materials.  ey too require 
analysis: they are never homogenous or static, but always emphasised, gradated, 
coded, reworked, transformed in particular ways. So the counter-tradition 
of cultural representations of the North has already sharply felt and intensely 
disputed our apparent supplication to the realm of images which Rancière has 
more recently pinpointed. As Rancière urges:  “Emancipation begins when we 
challenge the opposition between viewing and acting: when we understand 
that the self-evident facts that structure the relations between saying, seeing 
and doing themselves belong to the structure of domination and subjection”.13 
Hence the emancipated spectator actively interprets and translates the images and 
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representations proered to him or her rather than accepting these a priori as the 
transparent and agreed constitution and transmission of knowledge.
And if that galvanized and empowered spectatorship occurs with moving 
images in Elephant, then it is also to be found in photography, supposedly the 
medium most statically identical to both itself and its subject matter according 
to those who would subordinate us to the realm of images. For example, Susan 
Sontag’s On Photography makes us ‘image-junkies’, who, like the chained souls 
in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, are enticed from reality and experience and to 
photography by “mere images of truth”.14 Sontag’s cultural history of photography 
links it, correctly, to regimes of surveillance and control, to the round-up of 
the Communards in 1871 and to criminal proles, crime scene forensics and 
modern policing in general. She then argues that this relation of power, truth and 
representation in photography became disseminated, in a putatively democratic 
manner that is actually a spurious, consumerist voyeurism and relativism, at a 
micro-level so that we could all nominally participate in the authority of this gaze 
which paradoxically supplanted the very reality it captured: “To photograph is to 
appropriate the thing photographed. It means putting oneself into a certain relation 
to the world that feels like knowledge – and, therefore, like power”.15 However, to 
Sontag, this relation to the world is actually the antithesis of knowledge, since we 
are enslaved to and by the medium and its mediation of the referent that provides 
a degraded interpretative framework on our behalf: “Photography implies that 
we know about the world if we accept it as the camera records it. But this is the 
opposite of understanding, which starts from not accepting the world as it looks. 
All possibility of understanding is rooted in the ability to say no. Strictly speaking, 
one never understands anything from a photograph”.16 Where writing or painting 
are selective interpretations, for Sontag, photography oers “a narrowly selective 
transparency”; it becomes a miniature slice of reality rather than a particular 
representation thereof.17 It is at one with its referent in a way that precludes space 
for interpretation or analysis. And the supreme irony for this line of argument is 
that this transparent medium ultimately eaces the reality that it apprehends and 
with which it becomes synonymous.
A comparable sentiment can be found in Roland Barthes’ Camera Lucida. 
Like Sontag, he distinguishes writing from photography on the basis that the 
former leaves space for play, reformulation and analysis, while the latter forgoes 
aesthetic method to become homologous with its object:  “e Photograph’s 
essence is to ratify what it represents […] no writing can give me this certainty”.18 
Photography becomes, at best, a kind of depleted pseudo-ethnography whose 
task is to authenticate the reality of a moment we will never be able to touch 
once that-which-is becomes captured as that-which-was in the photograph: “the 
photograph is literally an emanation of the referent”.19 It becomes a transparent 
medium shaped only by the pre-existing form of the thing which it displaces into 
representation. Its form, such that it assumes one in its compliant mimesis, is 
already determined by what is or was there.  Barthes does propose some capacity 
for the photograph to be brushed against the grain of this nakedly referential 
logic. In his classication of photography, Barthes distinguishes between what he 
terms the studium (the sets of social and cultural expectations which permit us 
to participate in, identify with, or understand the various gures, faces, objects, 
gestures) and the punctum (that which might grab us in unexpected ways, make 
us responsive to odd details, struck by strange juxtapositions or disarming 
contingencies). So Barthes designedly names the punctum, literally, as that 
which pricks, marks, or wounds us, but which also carries with it the sense of 
punctuation.20 In other words, it punctuates the grammar of the studium rather 
than overturning it; the punctum’s ability to arrest or surprise is still contained 
by a banal set of expectations which it occasionally enlivens but in whose eld 
of reference it still takes place. Barthes also tends to make the punctum operable 
solely as a solipsistic and individualized matter, so that the heightened moments 
of perception, when viewing the self-evidence of what-has-been, are reducible to 
his own “voice of singularity” and “all the élan of an emotion which belonged 
only to myself ”.21
So within the wider ‘society of the spectacle’ thesis, photography, of all the 
regimes of images, is made the sterile forensics of the referent. It merely documents 
but also makes us passive consumers of the image of the thing and thus suspends 
both the reality of the referent and our capacity to engage that reality as anything 
other than what it already is. In the context of representations of the North, 
such a model readily connects with, and both intensies and is intensied by, 
the standard account of the Troubles: it just is what it is. And this coincidence 
of the self-evident thereness of the referent and the deferent imitativeness of its 
mediation also pertains to another facet of photography claimed by Sontag and 
Barthes. Sontag claims that “All photographs are memento mori”, while Barthes 
avers that every photograph encapsulates “the return of the dead”.22 In other 
words, the paradox of the photograph, in wishing to freeze and to keep a moment 
for posterity, actually attests to the fact that this moment is now gone and it has 
become its preservation in photographic form. So the passing of time, mortality, 
haunts the yearning for eternal moments in photography. In the conventional 
framing of the Troubles, because it was viewed as an arrested and traumatic 
forestalling of history, of time and dynamics of change, to be represented in 
passively reective forms that could only ever be the exequies of that stasis, this 
proposition is remodelled. at-which-has-been becomes repeatable as that-which-
is; the already deadness of the referent becomes the justication for the form of its 
representation to a world which has moved on with resigned goodwill.
However, the best photographic interventions in this terrain turn the tables on 
this model. It is not the referent but the form of representation which is exposed 
as a kind of death, a frozen and xated gaze which would visit petrication on 
its objects. e best photography about Northern Ireland contests the realm of 
images by refusing to allow dominant forms of representation to become the 
Panopticon that can see everything but itself, and which would make its prisoners 
assent to viewing and being viewed solely through and by that gaze. For example, 
Victor Sloan’s Shop, Dungannon, from Moving Windows (1985), very astutely 
interrogates the studium (which is just as passively or already given and ‘there’ 
as the referent in Barthes’ classication of photography). e framing through 
the side window of the car foregrounds the covert transparency of surveillance 
in mainstream representations of the North, while, most crucially, the camera 
movement and slow shutter-speed combine to produce the after-image which 
appears as an explosion to the habitual studium of Troubles reportage. But here 
the studium is the framing; it loses the objective factness which it supposedly 
shares with its referent. e punctum, the awareness that an explosion is not an 
explosion (“ceci n’est pas une pipe-bombe”, Magritte might almost have painted 
here), does not simply punctuate an agreed studium. e studium becomes its own 
punctum in the manner in which it exposes itself as a strategy of representational 
containment, an eect of style and framing, where the only xed and pre-existing 
thing is not the referent but the ingrained socio-cultural expectations upon which 
the studium’s regime of images is based. is regime here discloses its limits; it is 
simply a visual grammar seeking to place a representation of its referent rather 
than being identical thereto. If representation is unveiled as contingent, insecure 
and bound to relations of power and appropriation, then this awareness also 
destabilizes the status of its referents, which are thereby unmoored and become 
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open to reinterpretation, reinscription, or redemption.  e terrain of the real is 
not already decided for emancipated spectators.
Sloan’s image therefore undermines Barthes’ claim: “Whatever it grants 
to vision and whatever its manner, a photograph is always invisible: it is not 
what we see”.23 It mediates that which would mediate us in the ‘society of the 
spectacle’ thesis, allowing us new ways to encounter not only representation but 
also reality. Willie Doherty’s work also divests governing regimes of mediation, 
the invisibility which they seek in determining their own  eld of the visible. 
As Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev discerns in what she deems the “fallible gaze” 
of Doherty’s various photographs, installations and  lms, the photographic and 
representational apparatus is always ‘evidently’ there.24 And rather than aligning 
his work with the standard terminus of the ‘society of the spectacle’ model, that 
all is mediation and that reality no longer exists other than as a second-order 
simulation of itself, whose falsity we all passively verify, Doherty’s aesthetic 
actively impels us to re-engage our world by allowing us to recognise supposedly 
settled worldviews as merely dominant ones. If the whole purpose of ideology is 
to e ace itself as ideology – to masquerade as the natural way of things – then, 
as with the thought of Slavoj Žižek, Doherty’s art makes us aware that the most 
ideological of all statements is: the facts speak for themselves.25 But rather than 
meaning there are no facts, no truth and no real, this awareness does not leave 
us passively in thrall to mediations. Instead it makes us more ably informed to 
evaluate and to analyse the ways in which our societies are mediated, and to 
intervene and to challenge these meanings and their referents, and thereby to 
rethink and transform the material basis of our world. In works such as  e Walls 
(1987) a dominant visual regime that o ers itself as a total picture is rendered 
absolute only in its stylised, mediated e ort to totalise a  eld of representation 
in its own terms so that, by extension, it cannot exhaust the referent it claims 
and must sit in antagonistic relation to other versions thereof. For once we can 
evaluate something which feigns to be the total permeation of reality, then our 
analysis is already outside of and antagonistic to that mediation, which is therefore 
only identical to itself and not to reality. It can neither remainder nor freeze those 
elements which would remain heterogeneous to it, so that the referent remains 
a space of dispute open to the dynamics of change rather than something we 
passively accept. 
Active and emancipated spectatorship is also furnished by Doherty’s Same 
Di erence (1990) and  ey’re All the Same (1991). In Same Di erence the images 
are never simply forensic authentications of their referent; they only evidence 
their own situated placement in relation to that material. And the use of text 
also helps confound Sontag’s dichotomy between the photograph as passive 
testimony and writing as active interpretation: “Only that which narrates can 
make us understand”.26 By contrast, here the narrative is also unmasked as a 
representational strategy intertwined with the regime of images seeking to  x 
rather than just re ect its referent.  is does not lead to passive relativism but to 
the active evaluation of relations of power and representation. So too the voice-
over in  ey’re All the Same implores that things are not self-evidently the same by 
opening up a space in which representation is not a priori identical to its referent, 
but confronted by a di erence and heterogeneity that it would exclude in order to 
sustain its own stylisation and framing. So photography and the regime of images 
are rigorously made unstable and contestable in these works. And, if photography 
is unstable in supposedly the most fatalistic of circumstances with the most  xed 
set of referents, then the latter are opened up to more than just determinism and 
passive acceptance.  ese visual engagements with the North during the con ict 
interrogate the framing or the representation, and, simultaneously, open up a 
less deterministic history.  e motif of surveillance in both Sloan’s and Doherty’s 
works not only forefronts issues of power, representation and the placement of 
evidence. It also, at a very pragmatic and quotidian level, serves as a reminder 
that surveillance, at its most basic, is a gaze that awaits only what it expects. It is 
only looking for its objects to become typical, to revert to type (as threat, criminal 
act, predicted behaviour and deviance) so that it might generalise and justify its 
whole  eld of representation around its expectation. If surveillance work is often 
tedious, Sloan and Doherty also self-referentially make the Panopticon gaze of 
surveillance expose itself as a kind of representational monotony, as a gaze that 
would seek to impose only the recidivist repetition of the Same and to blind itself 
to anything which is non-identical to that premised referent. Sloan and Doherty 
subvert the consensual transparency of the studium in Barthes’ model that is only 
ever punctuated, given a visual syntax by the punctum, since we, as emancipated 
spectators, apprehend it as having planted its own evidence. Moreover, the 
transparency of medium and referent in the Sontag conception of photography is 
ruptured in Sloan’s and Doherty’s works by this sundering of the representational 
and axiomatic continuum wherein the studium founds its evidence (its referent) 
on the basis of its own self-evidence (its representation).  e photograph is 
never allowed to agree its referent on the grounds of an already agreed frame 
of representation; the latter is reviewed as the site/sight of a dominance that is 
contestable.
Hence, the best artworks through the Troubles always contested the idea that 
they must be ex hypothesi; that is, undertaken according to the template already 
given.  ey were always a reminder that art is praxis rather than just a formally 
consensual conformity to, and imitation of, already agreed sets of actions. I cover 
all of this because I feel that this intense vigilance and refusal to accept terms of 
appropriateness for how art should function is just as necessary now as it was then. 
For the current dispensation, proclaimedly one of peace and political agreement 
that is typi ed by the o  cial grammar of Derry’s year as UK City of Culture, 
also houses a certain set of stipulations and directives as to what is appropriate 
for art now and in the future, as well as grounding its new artistic provision on a 
homogenous and fatalistic narrative of what-has-been.  e o  cial promotional 
literature, with some merit and some justice, embraces the opportunity to tell 
‘Our Story’. Given that the British and Northern Irish states punished Derry for 
decades for being too Catholic and it was occluded from any meaningful civic 
participation in these respective polities (or the fact that the city was initially 
bypassed by the University of Ulster, for which it was the most obvious location), 
it is entirely understandable that this chance to engage in civic connections 
within and across Ireland, Britain and the wider world, should be grasped. And 
“our story” is intentionally an inclusive one that seeks to weave di erent strands 
into an agreed narrative “from plantation to peace”. As the Creating A New Story 
section of the Executive Summary puts it:
As a cultural melting pot we recognise that our cultural and political 
traditions sometimes approach the past from divergent places and that the 
truth itself is lost in translation.  e “sum of unreliable parts” ultimately 
leaves us with some prejudicial thinking and we plan to use our Cultural 
Programme to de ne a new narrative through purposeful culture led 
inquiry which will allow for alternative views and ideas to be absorbed and 
considered.
Additionally, the executive aim is to place “culture at the heart of regeneration”. 
Again, especially for a city that was on the receiving end of the military apparatus 
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of the British state as well as its socio-economic sanctioning, this is, on its own 
terms, an admirable desire. However, there are contradictions and strictures 
underpinning this template of culture as promise, reconciliation and renewal. 
e imperative to tell the city’s story – “a story which must be told”, according 
to the executive brochure – is short-circuited by another peremptory narrative 
request: “In 2013 Derry~Londonderry wants, and needs, to tell a new story”. 
is need for a new story shapes particular projects such as STORY, BT Portrait 
of a City, and the public mural competition organized by Culture Company 
and Tourism Ireland. So Derry must tell its story but equally needs a new story. 
In this sense, the old story can be agreed only and insofar as it is placed as the 
traumatic narrative of the past which will no longer suce. It is reconciled only 
formally to the extent that, as a narrative, it makes the past homogenous with 
itself as sectarian violence. Hence a new story is required to move the city beyond 
that repeated stasis. So we can only tell a new story if we agree that the past was 
a bad one. Why else would a new story be necessary? e foundations of the 
requirement for a new narrative are built upon a view of the conict that is just 
as static and arrested as e Devil’s Own or Patriot Games. And this contradiction 
– now we can tell our story, except we can’t and we need a new one – can be mapped 
onto the superintending political discourses constituting the Peace Process in 
its institutional forms. Here there is another bold imperative – let’s make politics 
work – but this version of politics actually attenuates politics proper in two key 
ways. Firstly, it depoliticizes politics and purloins its capacity to disagree and 
dispute (let’s all just agree in our dierence and diversity, there is room enough in 
the devolved assembly for everyone as long as he or she consents to designating 
him or herself as a constituent of one of two communities). And secondly, it 
makes politics proper (the facility to dispute and contest) reducible to sectarian 
murder and violence (so let’s have no more of the past unless it is archived as the 
conceptual folk park of Two Traditions that both suppresses sectarianism and 
expresses it as kitsch).
If anything, we should have more and not less of the past, but, in this case, 
a history not at one with its governing and static representation; a history that 
views the conict, and political struggle more widely, as something more than 
sectarianism. Such a history would include an international set of engagements 
with Civil Rights (it reminds us that ‘You Are Now Entering Free Derry’ was 
an act of transatlantic solidarity with protestors in Berkeley, USA, rather than 
the token of an introverted and tribal Tradition), socialism and class struggle, 
feminism and anti-sectarianism, anti-imperialism, anti-fascism, anti-racism and 
so on. To occlude these dynamics of the past (which make the past more than a 
petried stasis that simply furnishes the museum exhibits of today’s kitsch), is also 
to quarantine them from the present and to make it self-evidently homogenous 
with itself, so that the new dispensation just is what it is. e static, monolithic 
version of the past cannot explain, for example, why some people today object 
to the presence of Raytheon in Derry. ere is another history heterogeneous to, 
and never bounded by, sectarianism that makes the Troubles part of processes of 
radicalism and change, which pre-date and inform them, rather than a reection 
of stasis. If art was able to refuse to serve regimes of what was appropriate and 
permissible during the Troubles (and to contest a prevailing view of that conict 
as tribal stasis), then it should also seek to confound the agreed identity of the 
present. ese are the stipulations for the public mural solicited by Culture 
Company and Tourism Ireland:
Of course it is unsurprising that ocial commissions like this will desire compliant 
art identical to its sanctioned and positivist requirements, but the stipulation 
blocking political symbolism is noteworthy for the way in which it once more 
construes politics in terms of an implied sectarian iconography. But even political 
murals in Derry and elsewhere are irreducible to sectarianism in any case. Would 
Free Derry corner have been eligible as a template if painted in the colours of the 
Palestinian ag (as it has been)? Again politics are bad or sectarian or disruptive 
(in a conrmation that ‘make politics work’ is an attempted depoliticization of 
the spectrum of politics). In strictly regulated contexts, part of the reconciliatory 
promise of culture in the ocial events is to express an agreed space for Two 
Traditions, so that you can have Irish dancing or Apprentice Boys events as 
well as those enlisting international celebrities and local people made good. 
And in addition to the Two Traditions template for culture (which embodies a 
sectarianism that it is paradoxically intended to resolve), the ocial programme 
makes room for art to be consumed, aptly enough by its ‘consumers’ who are 
repeatedly invoked in the literature. e City of Culture events are in danger of 
making two peremptory directives about the permissibility of art which actually 
foreclose the possibilities of artworks. Firstly, that culture is the expression of 
already agreed identities – an expression of the Two Traditions; and, secondly, 
that it must be consumed, that its recipients are consumers. Before my hostility to 
consumer art is misunderstood as elitism, let me turn that argument on its head 
by suggesting that elitism entails a small group of people deciding in advance 
how most people may engage with culture. To prescribe to people that they can 
encounter art as a member of one of  Two Traditions or as a consumer is elitist 
and patrols people’s responses for them.  ere is democracy in allowing art to 
take forms that are not preordained and, perhaps more importantly, in permitting 
people to make of art what they want in ways that have not been pre-empted by a 
cabal. Elitism makes art and the people who encounter it conform to an identity 
(as a cultural tradition, as a customer); but art also has the capacity to contest and 
transform identity, to remain non-identical to the way of the world and to unfold 
other pathways of living and thinking.
Bloody Sunday was, amongst its other murderous violations, an assault on 
the ownership of public space, the expurgation of Derry’s citizens from their 
own streets. e intense violence done to Derry’s civics helps explain the tenor 
of Seamus Deane’s Reading in the Dark (1996) which is very much estranged 
from the streets. Belfast novels like Glenn Patterson’s Fat Lad (1992) or Robert 
McLiam Wilson’s Eureka Street (1996) notably, in presaging and endorsing the 
ceasere and Peace Process eras, feel able to reconcile antagonisms between 
their respective characters in a supposedly shared and more public sphere, a 
new Belfast pulsing with diversity.27 Deane’s work is much more at odds with 
this positivism, its recondite enclosure haunting borderlines not only because 
it interrogates a particular version of nationalism as a kind of protracted and 
secretive family history but also because of that sundering of urban civics in 
Derry itself.  If the people of Derry were only visible in their own city through 
regimes of surveillance and violence, placing them as threats, targets, trespassers 
in someone else’s polity – as Willie Doherty’s work makes clear, as does Locky 
Morris’ Creggan Nightlife (1986) or Of Note (2004) across these dispensations 
– then we also need to be wary of a new regime that only permits the same 
citizens visibility and participation in civic life as consumers and customers, or as 
bearers of Two Traditions. is is still a regime of delimitation which prescribes 
in advance how people must conform to have access to a particular space. When 
Glasgow was European Capital of Culture in 1990, Jim Kelman, Alisdair Gray, 
Tom Leonard and other writers were part of the Workers’ City movement which 
opposed the ocial Merchants’ City gentrication of the city centre area. ey 
claimed that the institutional events excluded rather than included ordinary 
citizens (or sought their consent in a tokenistic way) and that they also destroyed 
(rather than regenerated or commemorated) a whole organic history of culture 
that was already there. When Liverpool became Culture Capital in 2008, part of 
the economic redevelopment of that city involved the demolition of the Liverpool 
Life Museum, an act which scattered to the winds a host of important archives 
of working-class culture, including the work of George Garrett, a writer and 
activist who taught George Orwell a thing or two about life and literature. Let 
not comparable things be done in the name of culture in Derry. 
I began by arguing that the best of art during the Troubles reminded us that 
a fuller understanding of Aristotle’s concept of mimesis necessitated more than 
just passive imitation, and also necessitated praxis, the faculty to reshape and 
rethink. Nonetheless, Aristotle’s formal templates for art and their recasting of the 
world only assume their fullest meaning when they are understood – as they were 
intended to be – when linked to Plato’s extra-artistic notion of ethos as elaborated 
in his Republic.28 Plato notoriously wished to banish the poets precisely because 
he feared art’s capacity to disorder divine hierarchies of forms and souls, to re-
form, de-form, un-form rather than accept the Form of Forms. He felt art was 
permissible only insofar as it served and endorsed the ethos, the organisational 
principle of his society’s hierarchy. So Aristotle’s formal template for dierent 
kinds of art and narrative establishes certain generic rules but it also ties these 
aesthetic functions to a prescription about art’s adherence to an ethos that sets 
the limits on the latter’s praxis. But, as Jacques Rancière’s work indicates, art’s 
praxis was always capable of rebelling not only against its own generic rules but 
also these extra-artistic constraints, of recasting what was permissible in art at a 
formal level while simultaneously challenging who had the right to be subjects 
and objects of art.29 I have tried to indicate that art during the Troubles had 
this capacity to challenge and disorder a governing representation of the way of 
the world; but I also feel that this refusal of art to be identical to a consensual 
worldview is just as vital today. If Alan Clarke’s Elephant sought to evaluate that 
which would make itself so self-evident that it was just there, then this imaginative 
and analytical intelligence and rigour should also be brought to bear on the 
present and the future. We should not allow the current dispensation to become 
another elephant in the room. Otherwise, in addition to ceding a monolithic 
view of the past – it just was what it was – we make the present an already 
agreed sphere – it just is what it is. eodor Adorno wrote that “all reication is 
a forgetting”. Reication – supplanting  an abstraction for the replete complexity 
and contestation of the world – is currently happening in the year of culture 
 To some, it’s a wall – to others, a blank canvas.
 To be considered the image needs to cover the following points:
 - It must capture what being UK City of Culture means to Derry~Londonderry,   
   celebrating the year of cultural events.
 - It must be future facing and positive to mark a new chapter in 
   Derry~Londonderry’s history.
 - It should not carry any political symbolism.
 - It will become a semi-permanent art piece, so must be relevant for years to come.
 - e image can’t be overly complicated with bold shapes and strong colours.
 - It should also have a varied colour palette to ensure a clear nal image.
FUGITIVE      PAPERS
                     SUMMER  2013       21
in the name of cultural tradition (art as the expression of Two Communities) 
and global capitalism (art as the expression of consumers, it is that which gives 
them their identities and something to consume).  ese two rei cations forget an 
alternative and heterogeneous history of the North of Ireland irreducible to the 
narrative of the Troubles as self-verifying tribal entrenchment.  ey also forget 
art’s ability to dissent from an agreed version of the present as a regime in which 
two communities meet to consume and  nd identity in their kitsch heritage and 
acts of consumption. Inverting the idea that art should imitate life, and thus 
endorse the latter’s prevailing identity and form, Adorno stated:
[…] in a subtle and sublimated sense, reality ought to imitate works of art. 
By their very presence, artworks signal the existence of the non-existent; their 
reality testi es to the feasibility of the unreal, the possibility of the possible. 
More particularly, the longing of art, which posits the possible reality of 
that which is not, metamorphoses to take the form of remembrance. In 
remembrance the present is combined with the non-existent in the form of 
that which was but no longer is.30
Put simply, art is able to constellate the past, present and future in new ways 
which confound the way of the world: by being able to give form to things as 
yet unformed; to re-form things de-formed by the violence of modernity. So art 
testi es to the possibility of the possible by the very fact of its being brought into 
existence: something which did not exist previously now does. And this yearning 
for the possible, for the future, is also a longing for, and act of, remembrance; 
a giving new form and expression to things excised from the present by a 
homogenization of the past.  is model is particularly prescient in a context 
where the present dispensation would make the past simply the one thing in the 
one form (a traumatic narrative for which there is now an amnesty) and, in so 
doing, secure both its own self-identity (it is self-evidently a new story) and its 
sovereignty over the future. Art, during the Troubles and now, has the capacity 
to recover the past as more than just a homogenous thing and to recuperate and 
project the present and the future as more than just the inevitability of what is, as 
processes that can realise the possible. Art as critique can remain non-identical to 
the self-identity of the world; it can refuse to delimit in advance what is possible, 
what might be formed.  e twin elephants proposing an ethos which would make 
all things identical to the governing regime of the present are the Two Traditions 
and consumer capitalist models. We would do well to bring art’s aptitude for 
critique to bear on these before they become a herd.
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